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The paper addresses two fundamental issues in epistemic axiology. It 
argues primarily that curiosity, in particular its intrinsic variety, is the 
foundational epistemic virtue since it is the value-bestowing epistemic 
virtue. A response-dependentist framework is proposed, according to 
which a cognitive state is epistemically valuable if a normally or ideally 
curious or inquisitive cognizer would be motivated to reach it. Curiosity 
is the foundational epistemic virtue, since it bestows epistemic value. It 
also motivates and organizes other epistemic virtues, so it is foundation-
al and central for epistemology. The second issue is the one of the funda-
mental bearer of epistemic value. I shall argue that truth is the primary 
goal, but that mere true belief is not the fundamental bearer. Rather, 
the bearer is a relatively minimalist kind of knowledge. Mere true belief 
cannot be rationally accepted in isolation from a supporting structure. 
However, any effi cient supporting structure introduces further epistemic 
goods (justifi cation, reliability, anti-luck guarantees), thus upgrading 
the original true belief. Mere true belief can be neither defended, nor ra-
tionally sustained through time, due to isolation. Mere true belief cannot 
be rationally sustained in the face of a slightest bit of contrary evidence 
(the Meno insight). Therefore, mere true belief is not rationally stable. 
Minimal knowledge is, and this accounts for the primary and secondary 
value problem, and for a relatively undemanding kind of tertiary value.
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1. Introduction
Let me fi rst express my gratitude to Ilhan Inan; I am very happy that 
we were able to organize an Ilhan day in Maribor, from which the pa-
pers in this volume mainly come.1
Many philosophers, scientists and educators agree that knowledge 
has a value. Inan is surely among them: in his brilliant curiosity book 
he writes:
Whether curiosity is taken to be a form of virtue or not, it should be clear 
that there are important connections between being curious and some of 
our basic epistemic attitudes and achievements. Knowing, for instance, is 
an epistemic achievement, at least in certain cases, and curiosity is one of 
its basic motivators. (Inan 2012: 143)
Other, related epistemic items, like true belief or understanding also 
seem to have a value. Some of the value seems clearly instrumental. 
Knowledge that my two new neighbors are happily married to each 
other might be useful for me in order to know what to expect from 
them, how to behave towards each and both, and so on. Knowledge 
that some Neptune moons are rich in water might turn out to be practi-
cally useful in a more distant future, when we might need water from 
outside our usual earthly sources. But, other kinds of value are also in 
the offi ng. I was happy to learn about the Neptune moons not because I 
expected that I will need some water originating from them, but simply 
because I saw it as a very interesting fact about our distant neighbors 
in the solar system. Call this other kind of value “intrinsic”. Call the 
value of epistemic states (or facts) “epistemic value”, or “e-value” for 
short. I shall assume that instrumental e-value is not problematic, and 
concentrate on the intrinsic e-value.2
Allow me a few terminological proposals. Take the basic epistemic 
item of your choice: truth, true belief, justifi ed true belief, knowledge, 
and understanding. Let me for now call it just „grasping”.3 I shall ab-
breviate grasping the truth that p, as „Gp”. Let us agree that some 
items of this kind do have intrinsic e-value. For example, “Some Nep-
tune moons are rich in water” has such value for me. Consider now 
some p and grasping the truth of it (Gp). One option concerning their 
value is that they are not valuable; at a more general, philosophical lev-
el, then, no such item has epistemic value. We have already embraced a 
more optimistic view, according to which such items often are valuable. 
1 Thanks go to Ilhan Inan, Safi ye Yiğit, Duncan Pritchard, Ian Carter, and 
other colleagues participating at the curiosity conference in Istanbul (2014), virtue 
epistemology conference at Taipei (2014), at the philosophy conferences in Rijeka 
(2014) and Bled (2015), the Inan conference in Maribor in April 2015, and at the 
discussion of my presentation in Edinburgh in 2016.
2 I am leaving aside here the diffi culties concerning the instrumental e-value, 
put forward by Allan Hazlett in his (2013).
3 Following Duncan Pritchard’s (2014) terminology of grasping the truth (either 
true belief, or something richer and closer to knowledge).
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Now, suppose I am interested in “p”, and curious whether things are as 
the proposition p represents them to be. Again, there are two options. 
I might be curious about the items as a means to an end, extrinsically 
and instrumentaly. Knowledge that my two new neighbors are happily 
married to each other often has this extrinsic character, having to do 
with expectations and useful ways to behave. Alternatively, some topic 
might be intrinsically interesting, epistemically attractive in itself. Fol-
lowing Brady (who in this context also mentions Hurka (2001: 6)) I 
shall equate intrinsic goodness with non-instrumental goodness, leav-
ing aside complicated cases where one can, in a sense, have one without 
the other (Brady 2009: 265).
Intrinsic curiosity and intrinsic e-value will be our topic. I have al-
ready quoted Inan. Let me add one more quote connecting curiosity to 
epistemic value:
Human curiosity may or may not be considered to be a virtue; but even if it 
isn’t, it must still be of vital importance in its relation to certain epistemic 
attitudes that most of us value. We wish to be inquisitive and open-minded, 
and we wish to realize how fallible our beliefs are and become aware of 
our own ignorance and our cognitive limits. This requires epistemic self-
refl ection. But where would one fi nd the motivation to do this? There are a 
lot of things that we do not know, but only a small portion of them is brought 
to our consciousness. Why is that? Because we care about certain things 
and not others. We have an interest in certain topics, and we care to know 
more about them. It is this kind of interest that motivates us to refl ect on 
our ignorance, and only then we become curious. So in this sense, curios-
ity is value laden. We are curious only about things that we are interested 
to know. Such an interest surely is a product of what we value. Even if we 
don’t value the very object of our curiosity, we are interested in it because 
we believe that coming to know it relates to certain things that we do value. 
The broader our interests are, the broader the scope of our curiosity. (Inan 
2012: 183)
Let me next borrow three more quotes listed by Stephen Grimm in his 
(2008) paper, to illustrate the fact that epistemologists normally accept 
that some items have intrinsic e-value:
[Goldman:] Our interest in information has two sources: curiosity and prac-
tical concerns. The dinosaur extinction fascinates us, although knowing its 
cause would have no material impact on our lives. We also seek knowledge 
for practical reasons, as when we solicit a physician’s diagnosis or compare 
prices at automobile dealer shops. (Goldman 1999: 3)
[Alston:] [Although having true beliefs furthers our practical goals] the 
attainment of knowledge and understanding are also of intrinsic value. 
(Alston 2005: 31)
[Lynch:] We care about the truth for more than just the benefits it brings 
us... There are times in our lives when we simply want to know for no other 
reason than the knowing itself.
Curiosity is not always motivated by practical concerns. Consider extremely 
abstract mathematical conjectures. With regard to at least some such con-
jectures, knowing their truth would get us no closer to anything else we 
want. (Lynch 2004: 15–16) (All three quoted in Grimm 2008: 727)
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I shall return to these quotes in a few lines, and I shall freely assume 
that there is intrinsic e-value. Our question in this paper is where in-
trinsic e-value comes from, and the conjecture we are going to develop 
and defend is that it derives from human curiosity or inquisitiveness. 
The fi rst quote from Goldman already suggested the connection, with-
out making the crucial step of deriving value from curiosity. Similarly, 
in the continuation of Alston’s quote:
… the attainment of knowledge and understanding are also of intrinsic val-
ue. ‘All men by nature desire to know,’ said Aristotle, and this dictum has 
been reaffirmed by many of his successors.
And he goes on in the same direction:
Members of our species seem to have a built-in drive to get to the truth 
about things that pique their curiosity and to understand how and why 
things are as they are and happen as they do. So it is as close to truistic as 
we can get in philosophy to take truth as a good-making characteristic, and 
falsity as a bad-making characteristic, of beliefs and other outputs of cogni-
tion. (Alston 2005: 31).
The quotes point in the direction of the thesis that desire for knowl-
edge, or truth, or something similar is connected to the intrinsic value 
of these items, but they do not tell us what the connection is exactly 
like. Grimm himself is a bit more explicit:
…according to this way of thinking, our curiosity about how things stand in 
the world is . . . importantly like the thirst we (characteristically, at least) 
feel when our body is dehydrated. When our body is dehydrated—when we 
experience thirst—satisfying our thirst is naturally thought to possess a 
kind of intrinsic value. (Grimm 2008: 727).
(Let me note that he does not clearly endorse the way of thinking he 
mentions.) I shall try to formulate the claim about the assignation of 
e-value by the desire to know, and in doing it, assign the central role 
to the desire, which I shall simply call “curiosity”. Curiosity bestows e-
value. It is central for the area of epistemology, and we shall be explor-
ing one important aspect of this centrality.
All this brings us to the work of Ilhan Inan dedicated to curiosity. As 
Safi ye Yiğit has noted at a presentation (in Maribor), my work could be 
seen as being complementary to his. Inan is focused upon more internal 
matters, above all the defi nition of curiosity, whereas I am more inter-
ested in its external status within the general fi eld of epistemology, in 
particular virtue-epistemology. In my fi rst paper connected with Inan’s 
work I have noted that his descriptive-explanatory interest in curiosity 
is well-matched by my normative view that curiosity is the central mo-
tivating epistemic virtue, since his stress on the explanatory centrality 
of curiosity is well matched by its central normative role in the account. 
Here I shall be making a step further and talk about curiosity bestow-
ing epistemic value; I hope our views can still be brought into harmony.
Besides this broad agreement, I shall be referring to Inan’s work in 
talking about kinds of curiosity that can bestow value, since his work 
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on various degrees of ignorance (inostensibility) is very useful for draw-
ing distinctions in this fi eld. Finally, when I shall be characterizing 
valuable epistemic states, I shall, besides propositional belief/knowl-
edge take into account Inan’s highly relevant objectual(ist) distinction 
of inostensible vs. ostensible conceptualizing of the target of curiosity.
Here is the brief preview. We have two issues to address, fi rst, the 
metaphysical one: where does the e-value come from? Is it more subjec-
tive or more objective? Second, the epistemological issue: which items 
are really epistemically basic?
I want to start from the metaphysical issue, the crucial issue in 
epistemic axiology. So, in the next section (section 2), I shall be talking 
about grasping, leaving open its precise nature, and going straight to 
the metaphysical issue of the source of value. I shall introduce the idea 
of response-dependence, and propose that e-value is response-depen-
dent. Graspings of “p” are e-valuable because they would be positively 
valued by relevant cognizer(s), on the basis of interest in whether p, 
or p-curiosity. Curiosity is the foundational epistemic virtue, since it 
bestows epistemic value.
Section 3 discusses the issue of the target of idealized curiosity 
which is at the same time the fundamental bearer of epistemic value, 
namely a relatively minimalist kind of knowledge. Mere true belief 
cannot be rationally accepted in isolation from a supporting structure. 
This point is introduced by a discussion of a coffee-machine thought ex-
periment, and the e-value of reliability is affi rmed and discussed. The 
result is then developed into a characterization of the structure(s) that 
are serious candidates for the bearer of e-value.
Section 4 brings together the results from the two previous sections, 
and connects them to the conjecture that curiosity is also an organizing 
epistemic virtue. It thus ends with the double claim: curiosity organiz-
es all other epistemic virtues, and it bestows e-value on our knowledge, 
and knowledge-like states.
2. Response-dependence, curiosity and value
Once upon a time I wanted to know whether Neptune’s moons are rich 
in water, and I learned from a reliable source that they are. Sue wanted 
to know which town is the capital of Rwanda, Inan tells us (2012: 138), 
and she learned that it is Kigali. I ended up having a piece of proposi-
tional true belief, hopefully even a piece of knowledge. Sue ended up 
with a piece of ostensible information (“Kigali”) with which to replace 
her former inostensible description “the capital of Rwanda”. We ended 
up with positive “graspings”, to use the term introduced in the previous 
section. I had a propositional grasping, Gp, of the proposition that p, 
Sue had an objectual one, Go, of the object o. We were both happy, since 
we reached something that has epistemic value (e-value, for short) for 
each of us. We shall discuss in the next section the precise nature of 
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the bearers of e-value. Here, let me just mention that I agree with a 
long tradition that on the propositional side truth is paramount, and 
I assume that in the case of objectual acquaintance correctness plays 
the same role. But what about achievement? It is welcome but it is not 
crucial.
Now, how can we account for such intrinsic e-value? Someone may 
try to avoid the problem by denying the existence of intrinsic e-value: 
nothing is intrinsically valuable as the object of cognition, or as the 
state of grasping it. Some of my students were defending this intrinsic 
e-value nihilism. We agreed at the beginning of the paper that nihil-
ism is untenable: knowing facts about Neptune, or Rwanda, might be 
intrinsically valuable.
So, the tactics to be followed in this section will be to assume that 
some Gps (and Gos) are e-valuable; where does the intrinsic epistemic 
value of Gps (and Gos) come from? Let me call both Gt for short, “t” 
standing for “target”. Now, what is epistemic valuing like? The usual 
feeling (“phenomenology”) is clear: some Gts concerning some states 
of affairs (or objects) are intrinsically e-valuable, and people, if intel-
ligent, well-informed-educated and sensitive are curious about these 
states of affairs. Here is Inan:
If curiosity always involves interest and interest always involves values, 
then it follows that curiosity is always value-laden. I believe that such a 
position is correct. This would imply that strictly speaking there is no such 
thing as “sheer curiosity”, if the term is taken to refer to a mental state in 
which one is merely curious about something that is not motivated by any-
thing he values. (Inan 2012: 128) 
And the link with the desire to know is easy to spot:
If such an interest causes a desire to know, then it must be of the second 
order, in that the curious being not only has to be aware of what he or she 
does not know but must also desire to come to know the unknown. What 
exactly is involved in such a desire to come to know the unknown, how it is 
possible, and whether such a desire is to be taken as identical to that mental 
state of curiosity are issues to be explored now.
It appears that the general tendency is to take curiosity as being an es-
sential tool in achieving something that has intrinsic value, whether that is 
knowledge or understanding, in the propositional or objectual sense. (Inan 
2012: 10)
This is what we have on the side of the desiring or interested cognizer. 
On the side of the object, the target to be grasped, grasping itself, or 
its external referent, we have a brute fact of being valuable. But why 
would a target of curiosity have intrinsic epistemic value? Take Nep-
tune’s water-rich moons and the capital of Kigali (or the fact that a 
determinate city is such a capital). Why would anything about them 
have intrinsic epistemic value? Consider fi rst the extrinsic value: in-
formation about Neptune’s water-rich moons is epistemically extrinsi-
cally valuable because it is useful for us. But the idea that there is a 
non-relational intrinsic value attached to them (or to Kigali), and that 
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such a strange fact could be dictating epistemic axiology seems a bit 
extravagant. Just postulating that it has one leaves epistemic value 
unexplained.
We are thus facing Euthyphro’s dilemma concerning the order of 
determination: does curiosity bestow value upon truths and graspings 
of truths or is it the other way around? Analogous questions arise about 
other kinds of value (moral, aesthetic) and the usual feeling (“phenom-
enology”) and the kinds of options are the same. As we are all aware, 
there are roughly three groups of options altogether, differing in the 
order of determination.
First option: graspings (Gp, Go) and their objects are not really 
valuable; ‘e-value’ is mere projection. We might call it value nihilism, 
or strong anti-realism (projectivism). An example of it is offered by Ste-
phen Stich in his 1990 book.4
Second option: graspings (Gp, Go) and their objects are intrinsical-
ly e-valuable in themselves—strong realism. Here, the strong realist 
claims that intrinsic e-value determines human curiosity (at least in 
the right cognizers). A fi ne defense of such objectivism about e-value 
can be found in Michael Brady (2009) and I shall be addressing some of 
his arguments a few pages below.
Third option: graspings (Gp, Go) and their objects are e-valuable 
because of our curiosity-dispositionalism or the response-dependence 
view. This is the view to be defended here.
Note the analogy with color: strong anti-realism (projectivism) 
would claim that ‘nothing is really red”. Strong realism would claim 
that being red is a completely objective feature of red because it pro-
duces some relevant redness-related perceptual state. Finally, the re-
sponse-dependence view has it that a surface is red because it tends 
to produce the redness-response in relevant observers under normal 
circumstances.
I shall set aside the strong projectivism that comes close to error 
theory, and e-value nihilism, and turn directly to response-dependen-
tism (dispositionalism) and thereby to the claim thatintrinsic curiosity 
is the e-value bestowing epistemic virtue. This is the strong (and, to 
many tastes problematic) claim that I want to start to defend here. 
Here is the general form for accounting for e-value:
p (&Gp) are e-valuable iff a person H, suffi ciently cognitively nor-
mal (or, alternatively, idealized), and familiar with the domain of p, 
would be stably intrinsically curious about p.
Now we need a bit of refi ning. Let me start by introducing a distinc-
tion. When Sue learns about Kigali being the capital of Rwanda, she 
experiences the information (and her grasping of it) as being valuable. 
This is the subjective aspect, and I shall talk of e-value as experienced, 
or e-VALUEexp distinguishing it from the objective e-value we want to 
account for (compare it to the experience of surface being colored, in 
4 See my extended criticism in Miščević (2000).
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contrast to the objective color). So, please note the terminology: Value 
as experienced = valueexp
 The experience represents the information about Kigali (and 
the grasping of it) as being valuable; the value as experienced is being 
felt as the property of the information (and grasping). I can feel how 
valuable this thing I have learned is for me, Sue might think. And the 
experience is transparent; it goes right to the target itself. The e-value 
is transparently present in the target:
1. e-valueexp is being experienced as being a property of a state of 
affairs. (A transparency datum) 
The datum is both obvious and robust. It crucially distinguishes the ex-
perience of value from the experience of pain-causing devices. Locke’s 
mana (a laxative inducing stomach pain), a device that produces pain 
in the thumb, say a thumbscrew, or an imaginary pain-producing sur-
face, like those in Wittgenstein’s thought experiment are, or would be, 
experienced in a quite different way. Victim’s perceptual apparatus 
does not ascribe to those a phenomenal property corresponding to their 
pain-producing power. With value, as with color, things stand other-
wise: they are experienced as belonging to the targets.
1a. Intentionally experiencing e-value is an act of axiological intu-
ition.
I use the term “intentionally” in the sense of being object-directed. Re-
member our wondering at what non-human facts could make an item 
(like “Neptune’s moons are rich in water”, or the Kigali fact) intrinsically 
epistemically valuable. In a sense, the wondering points to a minimally 
naturalistic stance: there is nothing in the nature of physical reality 
that accounts for axiological properties. This gives us our next premise:
2. The e-valueexp is not an experiencer-independent property of the 
state of affairs. (naturalism)
It has been objected by Stroud that accepting the scientifi c, “unmask-
ing” premises, like our 2, leads the theoretician to believe there are no 
corresponding properties. His example involves color. He claims that in 
order to defend such a view, the theoretician must be able to “identify 
perceptions as perceptions of this or that colour without himself ascrib-
ing any colour to any physical object”, and this “cannot be done” (Stroud 
2002: 245; the argument is deployed at length in 2000, Ch. 7). However, 
this objection underestimates the possibilities of bootstrapping: the un-
masking theoretician starts in his own case with the full panoply of 
commonsense beliefs, and then proceeds by weakening them, as his 
theorizing progresses, going from “this is red” to “this looks red to me”, 
where the content of “red” changes accordingly. To apply it to our case, 
the response-dependentist theoretician starts in his own case with the 
full panoply of commonsense beliefs, and then proceeds by weakening 
them, as his theorizing progresses, going from “this is valuable” to “it 
feels valuable to me”, where the content of “valuable” changes accord-
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ingly. And he does not have to end up as a value nihilist, as we shall 
see in a moment.
3. The e-valueexp is not a property of a subjective state (From Trans-
parency).
It is the value projected onto the target (moons, Kigali and facts about 
them). Unfortunately, both claims, 2 and 3, attribute a certain error to 
Sue. But, no one is perfect. And our everyday experiences and folk con-
ceptualizations offer no guarantee of being error-free. Sue’s error might 
be like the folk error of taking “up” and “down” as absolute properties 
of space. It is not dramatic, but it is an error nevertheless. Charity in 
interpretation dictates that we don’t see folk as referring to nothing 
whatsoever when referring to directions conceptualized in the absolut-
ist, folk way. Rather, they are best interpreted as managing to refer to 
the property that is the closest cousin of the intended one. The point is 
not just minimizing the error, but also rationalizing it, making it intel-
ligible. Charity and inference to the best explanation go hand in hand. 
The traditional dispositionalist or response-dependentist thesis honors 
both. It captures the fact that the closest actual referent for color con-
cepts and expressions is the disposition of surfaces to cause the target 
intentional states. And that the closest actual referent for value con-
cepts and expressions is the disposition of targets to cause the right in-
tentional states. And it does this stressing the right order of determina-
tion: what makes a surface red is its state-causing power, and not the 
other way around, what makes the information e-valuable is causing 
the satisfaction of curiosity, and not the other way around. Therefore 
(by principles of charity and by inference to the best explanation):
4. Conclusion: Being e-valuable in the objective sense is being such 
as to cause the response of experiencing e-valueexp in normal/ideal-? 
observers under normal circumstances. (Response-intentionalism)
Let us now start unpacking the Conclusion. As for observers, we have 
left open two options, the fi rst referring to normal observers, the second 
to ideal ones. Start with the fi rst, the egalitarian one:
p (&Gp) are e-valuable iff a person H, endowed with at least normal 
cognitive capacities and at least some general knowledge, and fa-
miliarity with the domain of p, would be stably intrinsically curious 
about p (either whether p is true, or about truths in connection with 
p, or both).
Assume that the cognizer is aware of her cognitive capacities (a small 
idealization). But now, why do we say “in connection with p”? To deal 
with the “curious facts” problem raised by Brady (2009: 278–9). Sup-
pose we think about the following piece of information:
It is forbidden for aircraft to fl y over the Taj Mahal.
Brady suggests that we are happy to know such facts without having 
any antecedent curiosity about them. I suggest that there is a conse-
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quent curiosity: we appreciate grasping them because we fi nd them 
curious, raising further questions, like why anyone would forbid fl ight 
over Taj Mahal and the like.
But this is just the beginning of a dialogue with Brady, who has 
come up with a collection of objections to the response-dependentist ac-
count in his paper on curiosity and the value of truth in the Epistemic 
Value volume. Here is his remark about the egalitarian version of the 
account (he doesn’t call it “egalitarian” himself):
But there seems to be a strong reason to be sceptical about this line on 
epistemic value. For it is a general truth in value theory that, although the 
fact that I do desire or care about something might incline us to think that 
that thing is worth desiring or caring about, it does not guarantee that it is. 
There is always the possibility that I desire or care about something that I 
ought not to desire or care about, that is, something that is not worthy of my 
concern. In other words, there is always the possibility that one of my ends 
or goals is not a proper end or goal. If so, we might think that the fact that I 
desire the truth on a particular subject for its own sake does not guarantee 
that the truth on that subject is worth desiring, or is valuable as an end. 
(Brady 2009: 269)
We obviously have to idealize; the question is how much. Here is the 
general form:
Gp is e-valuable iff a person H, endowed with (decent to high) cog-
nitive capacities and general knowledge, and familiarity with the 
domain of p, would be stably intrinsically curious about p (either 
whether p is true, or about truths in connection with p, or both).
Michael Brady in his paper delineates such a position without endors-
ing it; in fact he proceeds to criticize it and ends by rejecting it. Here is 
the proposal:
How can we move from the claim that we are naturally curious to discov-
er the answers to particular questions, to the claim that answers to those 
questions are valuable in themselves? This problem is pressing, given that 
there might be something amiss with our curiosity or concern, and which 
therefore casts doubt upon the value of the truths which constitute the ob-
ject of that curiosity or concern. A simple solution is to idealize the relevant 
concern for truth. Thus, we might claim that the truth on a certain issue is 
valuable, not if someone does care about or desire the truth on that issue, 
but only if the person would care about the truth under certain idealized 
conditions: if, for instance, the person would desire the truth on that issue 
were she fully rational (…). A process of rational idealization will bring to 
light whether the subject’s interest is instrumental or intellectual, will en-
sure that inquiries are not based upon false beliefs, and will rule out curios-
ity that results from irrational compulsions. We might therefore maintain 
that it is the satisfaction of natural and rational, idealized curiosity which 
has final value. (Brady 2009: 271)
Obviously, the proposal needs a lot of work to arrive at the right level 
of idealization. Too little is unsatisfactory, given human limitations; 
unfortunately, some people are intrinsically curious about worthless 
matters. Too much is equally bad: only high level problems will be in-
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trinsically interesting to such an epistemically ideal person. In addi-
tion, we have the issues of depth and width: short of omniscience, what 
is the right proportion of going into detail and depth, and wanting to 
encompass as many areas as possible? So, the general question is with 
us, concerning both subjects and circumstances: how much idealization 
and of what kind? I still believe that intrinsic curiosity is the e-value 
bestowing epistemic virtue. Instead of trying to solve all the diffi cul-
ties at once, I shall limit myself to a handful of problems, some of them 
raised by Brady and his original and challenging counterexamples.
First problem: the superfi ciality of novelty. In his “Interest and 
Epistemic Goodness” (2011) Brady starts from psychology: “There is 
wide agreement—among psychologists, at least—on the appraisal vari-
ables that generate interest”, he writes. “One of the central appraisals 
is of novelty: ‘whether or not an event is new, sudden, or unfamiliar. 
For interest, this novelty check includes whether people judge some-
thing as new, ambiguous, complex, obscure, uncertain, mysterious, 
contradictory, unexpected, or otherwise not understood.” (Silvia 2006: 
57). He also mentioned that interest and importance diverge. In the 
handout he points out that “… we tend to fi nd old, expected, familiar 
things comfortable or enjoyable, but are interested in things which are 
unexpected, unfamiliar, mysterious, baffl ing” (Brady 2011: 2). So, the 
curious person starts by noting that something is ambiguous (complex, 
obscure, mysterious, contradictory), and asks oneself how one should 
one understand it. He fi nds such interest superfi cial and unstable.
Answer: To me it seems that if curiosity is directed to the “new, am-
biguous, complex, obscure, uncertain, mysterious, contradictory, unex-
pected, or otherwise not understood” then its central goal is achieving 
understanding, rather than arriving at isolated items of knowledge, 
and I think it is epistemically quite a good thing. The interest in com-
plexity leads to the desire to understand, the crucial epistemic desire. 
Novelty is in the vicinity; it involves not-yet-understood matters. Fi-
nally, a virtuous researcher is able to control herself, to balance nov-
elty with relevance and depth, and so on. So much for the fi rst line of 
defense. But one may also add that the interest in the novel and the 
complex is, globally seen, extremely epistemically useful. Novelty liber-
ates us from cognitive inertia; just think of depressed people who have 
lost their natural curiosity.
Second problem: M. Brady’s symmetrical problem for curiosity as a 
source of value:
... [t]here are epistemic windfalls, truths whose value depends upon the fact 
that they were unsought, and so depends upon the fact that they were not 
the results of inquiry. (Brady 2009: 280)5
5 Here is a longer quote:
…we might think that there are epistemic windfalls, truths whose value depends 
upon the fact that they were unsought, and so depends upon the fact that they 
were not the results of inquiry. For example, if unsolicited affection constitutes a 
positive value in our lives, we might think that unsolicited knowledge of affection 
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He claims that, for instance, unsolicited knowledge of affection consti-
tutes a positive value in our lives.
Answer: Suppose I care for the love of three persons, Jane, Julia 
and Peter, but I don’t care at all whether Kate loves me, and I don’t 
give a damn for info about it. Why would “unsolicited knowledge” of 
her affection constitute a positive value in my life? So, I assume that 
these counterexamples to the response-dependentist account do not re-
ally threaten it. On the other hand, if I cared about Kate’s feelings, I 
would have normally asked myself whether she has affection for me, 
and thus I would have been (perhaps very passively and lazily) curious 
about the matter.
The third problem: the fact-value gap. Here is a remark against 
response-dependentism made by Stratton-Lake in his Introduction to 
Ross’s classic The Right and the Good:
[o]ur knowledge that certain things are intrinsically good does not seem to 
be derived from other evaluative knowledge, and given the autonomy of eth-
ics, this knowledge cannot be derived from non-evaluative premisses, such 
as our knowledge that we desire or approve of that thing. (Stratton-Lake 
2002: xliii)
A simple answer: Let us accept for the sake of argument that moral val-
ue is completely autonomous. We have no reason to accept the analogy 
with e-value; it is simply not so separate from its factual supervenience 
basis as moral value is.
The fourth problem: omniscience. Inan, Carter, and my student M. 
Bakalova warned me that a person, who knows everything and is thus 
epistemically close to perfection, would not be curious, and would thus 
paradoxically lack the alleged main motivating epistemic virtue.
One answer is that many human virtues are tailor-made for human 
agents in less-then-perfect but better-than hellish human circumstanc-
es. Curiosity is one such virtue, typical for fi nite and relatively ignorant 
beings, in need of constant updating of information in order to function 
successfully. (Analogy: an all-powerful, even omnipotent being does not 
need courage.)
But I would add more: I stipulate a slightly wider meaning of “in-
quisitiveness” that also includes cherishing the truth once found. It 
seems to me a natural extension of the narrower meaning: a person 
with bad memory but eager to learn things, who subsequently doesn’t 
care a bit for the knowledge acquired and is completely unworried 
about having forgotten everything she learned, is not consistently in-
quisitive. So, the hypothetical omniscient person who keeps her virtue 
by cherishing what she knows is “curious” in this wider sense.
does as well. Thus, I might learn that ‘she loves me’ because of her unsolicited 
declaration of love. Here my true belief has value that it would lack if it resulted 
from inquiry on my part. There seem to be a great number of surprising but 
welcome truths that fall into this category. So the efforts of inquiry are sometimes 
incompatible with the intrinsic value of true beliefs. (Brady 2009: 280)
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The fi fth problem is the issue of bad curiosity: some cases of curios-
ity are really bad. How can curiosity then bestow any positive value?
Answer: Most bad curiosity is the one that is extrinsically motivated 
(envy, bad goals, etc.) but what if I am intrinsically motivated, but my 
curiosity is still unacceptable (say, curious about the private life of my 
student, whom I just fi nd an interesting person, without having further 
goals but grasping truths about him)? In these cases, the moral dis-
value (in the example, the derogation of privacy) counterbalances the 
intrinsic e-value, and wins (there are two further sub-options: either 
the e-value is annihilated, or it stays there but is simply defeated by 
the negative extrinsic, moral disvalue).
Sixth problem: sometimes intense curiosity can block insight. Sci-
entists tell us that they got their best ideas when they stopped being 
obsessed with the issue they were working on; suddenly the insight 
would come, often in unexpected circumstances.
Answer: psychologists agree with scientists-discoverers, but they 
tell us that the best explanation is to postulate the existence of a sub-
personal inquisitive drive (see Kounios and Beeman (2015)).
There are further issues to be addressed: kinds of curiosity refl ected 
on the features of e-value, the nature and the origin of e-disvalue, and 
many more. But we have to conclude. Let me reiterate the main idea of 
the section and of the paper: intrinsic curiosity is the e-value bestowing 
epistemic virtue. Probably most things that concern us in our normal 
human lives are response-dependent: goodness-wickedness, beauty-ugli-
ness, attractiveness-repulsiveness, being humanly meaningful vs. being 
meaningless and empty. In contrast, most things that are metaphysi-
cally important are not response-dependent. To put it in a form of a slo-
gan, response-dependence belongs to the manifest picture we care about 
humanly, independence belongs to the deep reality we care about scien-
tifi cally. Philosophy is the happy branch in which we can discuss both.
Let me now turn to the empty slot I left in the story. What are 
the targets of curiosity and the bearers of epistemic value? Although 
I think that the proposed account would work for a very wide range of 
candidates, an opponent might see the lack of discussion of the topic as 
a fatal lacuna in the account. So, the question should be addressed. It 
will take a lot of space, in comparison with the main topic, but still I 
apologize for too brief a treatment of an intricate and important topic.
3. Targets of curiosity: Bearers of epistemic value
We have been freely talking about “grasping” as candidate bearer of 
epistemic value. But what kinds of doxastic-epistemic states are eligible 
candidates? Let us stay with propositional curiosity and corresponding 
states; we shall try to generalize our result(s) to their objectual coun-
terparts later. Certainly, we have true belief, (internally) justifi ed true 
belief, knowledge, understanding and perhaps even more, for example 
wisdom. Does each item have a value? And what are the paramount 
406 N. Miščević, Epistemic Value. Curiosity, Knowledge
qualities that support the value? Let me agree with a long tradition 
that truth is paramount. But what about achievement? It is welcome 
but is not crucial. So many items are valued that do not involve sig-
nifi cant achievement, as Duncan Pritchard has argued at length, in 
detail and to my mind convincingly (for instance in his (2014).6 So it is 
good to have true belief, and to have internally justifi ed true belief, and 
reliably acquired true belief, and knowledge. But also the components 
(justifi cation, reliability) seem to be valuable. Knowledge seems to have 
a high status partly because of its stability and reliability. On the theo-
retical level it would be nice to have an account that could order the 
bearers of e-value, for instance show that value of understanding is 
greater than value of knowledge that is greaterthan value of justifi ed 
true belief that is greaterthan value of mere true belief (what about re-
liably acquired true belief?). But some comparisons might be diffi cult, 
and there might be no consensus about ordering.7
So, let me start by discussing the value of stable, reliable origin. It 
has been famously contested by Linda Zagzebsky, for instance in her 
(2003) paper, where she offers a few remarks on coffee and coffee ma-
chines, that have been reconstructed as a provocative thought experi-
ment. I shall use the summary offered by Duncan Pritchard, since it 
makes clear the thought-experimental character of the argument:
Imagine two great cups of coffee identical in every relevant respect—they 
look the same, taste the same, smell the same, are of the same quantity, 
and so on. Clearly, we value great cups of coffee. Moreover, given that we 
value great cups of coffee, it follows that we also value reliable coffeemaking 
machines—i.e. machines which regularly produce good coffee. Notice, how-
ever, that once we’ve got the great coffee, then we don’t then care whether 
it was produced by a reliable coffee-making machine. That is, that the great 
coffee was produced by a reliable coffee-making machine doesn’t contribute 
any additional value to it. In order to see this, note that if one were told that 
only one of the great identical cups of coffee before one had been produced 
6 But Pritchard goes very far:
When I say that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, I mean that from a 
purely epistemic point of view it is ultimately only truth that we should care 
about. Call this the truth thesis…
... Elsewhere, I have characterised this view as epistemic value T-monism, in 
that:
(i) it is a view about epistemic value specifi cally (that’s the ‘epistemic value’ part); 
(ii) it says that there is just one fi nally epistemically valuable epistemic good 
(that’s the ‘monism’ part); and 
(iii) it says that this fi nally epistemically valuable epistemic good is truth (that’s 
the ‘T’ part) (2014:114)
7 Compare John Gibbons’ (2013) book on the norm of belief. He notes that the 
following are all fairly plausible claims about when we ought to believe things.
•  (T) You ought to believe p only if p is true.
•  (J) You ought to believe p if and only if you’re justifi ed in believing p.
• (K) You ought to believe p only if you’d thereby know that p.
And that though they’re all plausible, they can’t all be true. But, he tries to do 
justice to all of them.
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by a reliable coffee-making machine, this would have no bearing at all on 
the issue of which cup one preferred; one would still be indifferent on this 
score. In short, whatever value is conferred on a cup of coffee through being 
produced by a reliable coffee-making machine, this value is ‘swamped’ by 
the value conferred on that coffee in virtue of it being a great cup of coffee. 
(Pritchard 2011: 246–7).
Pritchard calls it the swamping argument and here is his formulation:
(1) The epistemic value conferred on a belief by that belief having an epis-
temic property is instrumental epistemic value relative to the further epis-
temic good of true belief.
(…)
(2) If the value of X is only instrumental value relative to a further good and 
that good is already present, then it can confer no additional value.
(…)
(3) Knowledge that p is sometimes more epistemically valuable than mere 
true belief that p. (Pritchard 2011: 248–9) 
This brings the Swamping Problem onto the scene: if the value of a 
property possessed by an item is only instrumental value relative to a 
further good and that good is already present in that item, then this 
property can confer no additional value on that item. This holds for 
epistemic properties in relation to the good of truth. So, knowledge that 
p can be no more valuable than mere true belief that p. Pritchard ac-
cepts (1) and (2) and rejects 3. Knowledge has no added epistemic value 
in comparison to true belief. Justifi cation is epistemically worthless! 
But this seems really counterintuitive and problematic. Is there a way 
out?8
8 Here is a longer quotation from J. Kvanvig offering an analogous problem. He 
talks about Meno problem, of whether, and if yes, why knowledge is more valuable 
than true belief.
Assumption 1: The Meno problem can be solved if there is a property P that (i) 
distinguishes knowledge from true belief and (ii) is a valuable property for a 
belief to have.
Assumption 1, however, is false. To see that it is false, consider some simple 
analogies. If we have a piece of art that is beautiful, its aesthetic value is not 
enhanced by having as well the property of being likely to be beautiful. For being 
likely to be beautiful is a valuable property because of its relationship to being 
beautiful itself. Once beauty is assumed to be present, the property of being 
likely to be beautiful ceases to contribute any more value to the item in ques-
tion. Likelihood of beauty has a value parasitic on beauty itself and hence has a 
value that is swamped by the presence of the latter. Take anything that you care 
about: happiness, money, drugs, sports cars, and so on. Then consider two lists 
about such things, the fi rst list telling you where to obtain such things and the 
second list telling you where you are likely to obtain such things. Now compose a 
third list, which is the intersection of the fi rst two lists. It tells you of ways and 
places that both are likely to get you what you want and actually will get you 
what you want. But there would be no reason to prefer the third list to the fi rst 
list, given what you care about.
These analogies show that when the value of one property is parasitic on the val-
ue of another property in the way that the likelihood of X is parasitic on X itself, 
the value of the fi rst is swamped by the presence of the second. So even if likeli-
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Let us look at the coffee thought experiment again. Are we ever be-
ing offered the choice as described?
“Here are two beliefs, e.g. 
1. Wuhan is in China. and 
2. Maribor is the Slovenian town closest to Graz.
Both are true, but 1 is from an unreliable source, and 2 is from a 
reliable one. Which one do you prefer?”
Did you ever receive such an offer? Does it make sense? Imagine: I am 
telling you that Maribor is the Slovenian town closest to Graz, and that 
you are hereby getting it from an unreliable source! If I am offering you 
the choice, and you can trust me that “Maribor is the Slovenian town 
closest to Graz.” is true, then you are getting your belief from a reliable 
source. If you cannot, the offer cannot be formulated. In short, there is 
no viable equivalent of the tasting of coffee, no neutral checking: if the 
checking is worthy of its name, it yields more than mere true belief: ei-
ther justifi ed true belief, or knowledge. If it does not, it does not test for 
the truth of the belief. So, the coffee thought experiment is ok for cof-
fees. But it lets us down at the stage of generalizing (all kinds of goods) 
and of analogizing beliefs to cups of coffee. Moral: the coffee model is 
not applicable to beliefs.
I have been telling the story in terms of propositional knowledge, 
but it can be retold in terms of objectual curiosity and knowledge, dear 
to Inan. Let us repeat the game. I just told you:
“Here are two sentences:
1. Wuhan is in China. and
2. Maribor is the Slovenian town closest to Graz.
Both are true, but 1 is from an unreliable source, and 2 is from a 
reliable one. Which one do you prefer?”
Consider now the critical defi nite descriptions “the country in which 
Wuhan is located”, and “the Slovenian town closest to Graz”. You have 
started with two inostensible concepts, the fi rst corresponding to “the 
country in which Wuhan is located”, and second corresponding to “the 
Slovenian town closest to Graz”. In the game I am also offering you their 
ostensible equivalents, “China” and “Maribor”, but I am doing it in a 
thoroughly unacceptable way, by saying that the fi rst offer is reliable 
and the second is not. But it makes no sense to make an offer and then 
claim it is unreliable. It is not like offering two coffee cups that taste 
the same. The analogy with coffee fails for the ostensible/inostensible 
contrast as well as for the more traditional epistemological concepts.9
hood of truth is a valuable property for a belief to have, adding that property to a 
belief already assumed to be true adds no value to the resulting composite that is 
not already present in true belief itself. So Assumption 1is false; one cannot solve 
the Meno problem simply by fi nding a valuable property that distinguishes true 
belief from knowledge. (Kvanvig 2003: 45, thanks to J. Adam Carter for pointing 
the passage out to me.)
9 Here is the third consideration:
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So, merely true belief taken in isolation cannot really be rationally 
accepted. Belief is unlike coffee in crucial respects. Most importantly, 
its value cannot be tested without the test importing new, crucial infor-
mation that turns true belief into something more powerful (justifi ed 
true belief or knowledge). Therefore, a de facto true belief cannot be 
rationally accepted in isolation from these crucial additions.
The coffee model seems to make sense from the third person per-
spective, but not from the fi rst person perspective of the cognizer. And 
it is the cognizer that is being asked about her preferences, not the 
external judge. But what kind of stability is involved here? Pritchard 
claims it is merely practical,10 but in our context there is no mention of 
practical use. It is a matter of pure credibility, so, it should be informa-
tional or epistemic. Let me generalize. Here is a general dilemma for 
the coffee model:
If you were informed from an epistemically authoritative source that 
“p” is a true belief, then you would have reliable information that p.
If you were not, then you would have no reason to accept that p.
There is no middle ground here. The opponent, for instance Pritchard, 
might try to argue that our point is simply a matter of pragmatics. 
Indeed, offering a piece of information and claiming at the same time 
BELIEF-MACHINE VARIANT The person who is curious whether Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is true would not be fully satisfi ed by a mere true belief as to whether 
it is true. If offered a choice between a device that would, upon pressing a button, 
implant a true belief as to whether the Conjecture is true and a device that 
would implant knowledge, the subject would prefer the latter device and would 
do so to satisfy curiosity. Indeed, the requirement of knowledge is not merely for 
a justifi ed true belief. (Schmitt and Lahroodi 2008: 134)
So far, so good. But it is too little to say that the subject would just prefer the 
knowledge machine. Imagine waking up with the mere belief: Goldbach’s Conjecture 
is true. No reasons, no awareness of the source! Like the Truetemp. It would be quite 
irrational to accept the belief-machine offer.
10 Pritchard writes:
/t/here is little to be gained by responding to the swamping problem by arguing 
that the epistemic standing in question generates a practical value that mere 
true belief lacks. For example, suppose one responded to the swamping problem 
by arguing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because 
knowledge entails justifi cation and justifi cation is practically valuable. Justifi ed 
true belief, we might say—in a broadly Socratic fashion (…)—a ‘stability’ that 
mere true belief lacks, and this means that it is more practically useful to us in 
attaining our goals. The problem with this response, however, is that it doesn’t 
appear to engage with the swamping problem at all. After all, the diffi culty 
that the swamping problem poses concerns how to make sense of the idea that 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because it involves an epistemic 
standing which better serves our specifi cally epistemic goals—in particular, the 
epistemic goal of true belief. Thus, the kind of value that is at issue is specifi cally 
an epistemic value. Accordingly, even if it is true that knowledge has more all-
things-considered value because it entails an epistemic standing which adds 
practical value to true belief, the problem would still remain that, on the face of 
it, knowledge is not epistemically more valuable than mere true belief (Pritchard 
2011: 246–7)
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that the source, namely the speaker herself, is unreliable is a pragmat-
ic contradiction, or paradox. But this pragmatic incompatibility tells 
us nothing about the actual distribution of e-value, he might claim. 
We need an example of a situation where pragmatic considerations 
are blocked, but the importance of justifi cation and reliability remain. 
Here is a possible example:
The elections
You are very curious about the presidential elections in my country, 
which involve two candidates, Kolinda and Josip. It is the election 
day, 5 p.m. The results are not yet known, they will be known at 
midnight, but you are not aware of it, and you trust me.
I try a practical joke. I toss a coin (at 5 p.m.) And the coin says 
“Kolinda”. I call you and tell you “Kolinda is the winner”. You ac-
cept, form the belief and you thank me warmly for the info.
At midnight, it becomes public that Kolinda indeed won. I call you, 
and tell you that it was a joke, and I had no clue when I called you. 
“But at least, my info was true”, I add. How would you react?
One rational reaction: “Well, don’t do it again, Nenad!” Others would 
be along the same line, criticizing me for my stupid joke. Suppose I 
answer:
“Yes, but your belief was true, you should appreciate it a lot by your 
own lights!”
This is even worse. It looks like the worth of merely true belief is rather 
minimal. And it looks that by making you accept the true belief that 
Kolinda is the winner, I did you a disfavor.
Moral one: true belief is valuable, but implanted alone it has a mini-
mal value!
The impression can be strengthened:
We generally don’t regard stable arrangements as a series of one-
shot deals: a good relationship is not a two thousand and one-night 
stand, a stable home is not a series of many 24-hours lasting impro-
vised shelters. But with knowledge, it is even more dramatic. The one-
shot offer itself does not make sense. Acceptability and reliability go 
together in a package deal.11 I shall call the moral of the election story 
the “package deal argument” (See Carter et al. 2013).
I have been telling the story in terms of propositional knowledge, 
but it can be retold in terms of objectual curiosity and knowledge, dear 
to Inan. So, in the story retold, you are interested in who the new pres-
ident of Croatia is. You have an inostensible description of him/her, 
namely “the new president”. What you want is a more ostensible infor-
11 The type of combination is widespread, way beyond the mere intrinsic e-value 
of truth. Imagine you would value a lot having a nice drink. And you are offered a 
glass, you drink it and enjoy it. Next day you are told that it could have been poison. 
You would not thank the person for the nice drink, although the drink is what you 
basically value.
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mation, let’s say the name. (with all the problems that go with it, listed 
and brilliantly analyzed by Inan in 2012:142 ff, in connection with the 
name “Kigali”). Now, with the practical joke I actually gave you the 
right information, it’s Kolinda. Still, you are not satisfi ed, after you 
hear about my actual ignorance at the time of giving the info. What is 
needed is the package deal: ostensible information with some guarantee 
of reliability. I cannot defend the fully isolated true belief (except go-
ing the Martin Luther WAY: here i stand and believe, ich kann nicht 
anders!).
So, here is my proposal: combine the package deal argument with 
the failure of the coffee thought experiments. The resulting picture will 
be the following:
Truth is the primary goal, but mere true belief is not the funda-
mental bearer of e-value. Rather, the bearer is a relatively unde-
manding, minimalist kind of knowledge. Curiosity follows the same 
pattern: a rational cognizer wants truth plus supporting structure.
Mere true belief is only minimally valuable for the curious cognizer. I 
told you the name of the winner, you got the true belief, by pure luck. 
Truetemp got one by insertion into his brain. How valuable, epistemi-
cally speaking, is it for you and for Truetemp respectively? Not much; 
very little has been given to you and to him. (You have right to be of-
fended at my playing games with you, Truetemp at tampering with his 
brain, for very little in terms of epistemic gain!). So this is the typical 
epistemic value of true belief without supporting structure. It is not 
impressive. Plato already knew it: such true beliefs are like Socrates’s 
daidaleia, moving statues-robots, utterly defenseless, and ready to run 
away (Meno 97a–98b). Mere true belief cannot be rationally sustained 
in the face of a slightest bit of contrary evidence. For example, I believe 
(truly) it is not raining, but I have no supporting structure for my be-
lief. A mere drop of water on my window, say from my neighbor’s hose, 
makes me change my mind, and the true belief is gone. But also, my 
change of mind is in a sense less than rational. In contrast, if I have 
a supporting structure (I can see no clouds in the sky) the rational de-
fensibility is there. Now, is rational defensibility merely practical and 
instrumental? Why would it be? Why is this not epistemic?
If you already have an intuition that the additional element of sta-
bility and defensibility does add epistemic value, you can use a Modus 
Tollens: the additional element cannot add epistemic value unless it is 
itself epistemically valuable. It does add epistemic value. Therefore, 
the additional element is epistemically distinctly valuable.
Mere true belief (as well as mere correct ostensive information) cannot be 
rationally accepted in isolation from a supporting structure.
However, any effi cient supporting structure introduces further epistemic 
goods (justifi cation, reliability, anti-luck guarantees), thus upgrading the 
original true belief.
Mere true belief (as well as mere correct ostensive information) can be nei-
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ther defended, nor rationally sustained through time, due to the isolation. 
(see Carter et al. 2013)
Mere true belief cannot be rationally sustained in the face of a slightest bit 
of contrary evidence (The Meno insight). Therefore: 
Mere true belief (as well as mere correct ostensive information) is not ra-
tionally stable.
Mere true belief (as well as mere correct ostensive information) is only mini-
mally valuable for the curious cognizer.
Epistemic goods come in package deals.
Rational stability is an epistemic, not merely a practical property (or sta-
tus).
Let us leave open how massive the supporting structure should be. For 
our purposes a molecular, not holistic structure is enough. The Tru-
etemp analogy suggests that the structure should contain an indica-
tion of origin, some indication of circumstances (perceptual, testimo-
nial, memory-based belief). All this might help to account for the value 
problem. Let me just note the direction of solution, leaving the details 
for another occasion. First, showing that knowledge is more valuable 
than mere true belief, which we did. Second, showing that knowledge is 
more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge. Justifi ed true 
belief without some indication of reliability is not a satisfactory pack-
age deal.12 Finally showing that knowledge is more valuable than that 
which falls short of knowledge not merely as a matter of degree but of 
kind. A very modest proposal: the special status comes from the fact 
that (minimal) knowledge is the fi rst, or the basic kind of grasping the 
truth that has all the requisite qualities.13
Let me put my cards on the table in matters of the source of e-value 
of various candidates: the intrinsic e-value of true belief derives from 
the desire for truth, the intrinsic e-value of justifi ed true belief derives 
from the need for refl ective certainty, and the ability to defend one’s 
belief and transmit it if needed. The need for refl ective certainty, I sub-
mit, is epistemic as is the need for the ability to defend one’s belief 
and transmit it if needed (social epistemic). The e-value of knowledge 
derives from all the preceding elements plus defensibility and stability 
(achievement is optional). It is probably the fi rst satisfactory package 
that gives one, from the fi rst person perspective the epistemically sta-
ble supporting structure. Understanding is the next one; its intrinsic 
e-value derives from its richness and cognitive relevance and role in 
manipulating causes. All this would demand a lot of arguing; I have to 
stop here.
12 I leave for some other occasion the discussion of the view, due to Kvanvig, 
according to which knowledge knowledge is not the fi rst inquiry stopper, whereas 
the gettierized justifi ed true belief already is.
13 All this should be argued for on the bases of various proposed accounts of 
knowledge. I’ve been stressing stability. But similar considerations hold for other 
proposals. Consider D. Pritchard’s recipe for knowledge: virtue + anti-luck. The 
virtuous origin (like the old style justifi cation) secures the rationality of forming and 
keeping alive the belief. The anti-luck component caters for the stability.
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So much for beliefs and curiosity in general. But what about truly 
foundational beliefs (if there are any); where does package deal come 
from in their case? For instance, Wittgenstein’s hinges? A possible an-
swer is that they are presumably widely shared in the epistemic com-
munity (“shared” in several relevant senses), and their special status 
accompanies them as part of their package.
Next, what about the sub-personal level? I assume the story is 
roughly similar. Our cognitive modules trace the origin and creden-
tials of various inputs. A normally functional cognitive apparatus is 
able to distinguish sub-personally imagined from sub-personally per-
ceived contents. Let me borrow a pair of terms from Sosa (2015: 67 
ff). He talks about biological-functional vs. intentional, noting that on 
the biological level the proper function of the human belief-system is 
to represent reality-as-it-is: the representation should be as accurate 
as possible given the costs. On the intentional level the proper func-
tion links beliefs to the truth-goal. My own preference is to think that 
the intentional is continuous with the biological (Dretske, Millikan), 
but I will not be dogmatic here. A broad parallelism will be enough. 
On the sub-personal level our cognitive mechanisms search epistemic 
stability-defensibility as much as on the personal level. So, there is no 
principled problem.
I assume that similar considerations are valid for Inan’s ostensible/
non-ostensible contrast as they are for propositional beliefs. You might 
be offered an ostensible replacement (“China”) for your initial non-os-
tensible one (“the country in which Wuhan is located”), and the replace-
ment might be correct. Still it does not help much, if you don’t have a 
stable and reliable infrastructure supporting the replacement. If you 
have one, say, “I got it from my Chinese student, whose documents 
testify that he studied in Wuhan; so, presumably he is reliable about 
its location”, the ostensible characterization is epistemically valuable.
4. Conclusion: The centrality of curiosity
In this paper I have tried to do two things concerning the value of truth 
and knowledge, and their relation to curiosity. First, and most impor-
tantly, to address the Euthyphro’s dilemma concerning the order of de-
termination: does curiosity bestow value upon truths and graspings of 
truths or is it the other way around? Second, to offer a sketch concern-
ing the bearer(s) of epistemic value, and to adjudicate between purely 
truth-centered proposals, and wider options, including properties like 
reliability, stability and justifi edness.
Let me focus upon the fi rst task. The paper argues for a response-de-
pendentist account of intrinsic epistemic value of true grasping (belief, 
knowledge): intrinsic curiosity is the value-bestowing epistemic virtue. 
In short: the value is normally experienced as being a property of a 
state of affairs to be grasped. However, value naturalism suggests that 
it is not an experiencer-independent property of the state of affairs. 
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Hopefully, the value is not merely a fi ction. Therefore, by principles of 
charity and by inference to the best explanation, being epistemically 
valuable in an objective sense is being such as to cause the response of 
intentionally experiencing epistemic e-value in under suitable circum-
stances. Our graspings of propositions and objectual characterizations 
are epistemically valuable iff a person, endowed with at least normal 
cognitive capacities and at least some general knowledge, and famil-
iarity with the domain of p, (or, alternatively, the person’s somewhat 
idealized counterpart) would be stably intrinsically curious about p (ei-
ther whether p is true, or about truths in connection with p, or both). 
Similar conditions hold for objectual curiosity. We have tried to ad-
dress a number of objections to this view, and we hope to have offered 
at least beginnings of a right response. We concluded that curiosity is 
the foundational epistemic virtue that bestows epistemic value to its 
targets. Now, I would like to try connecting the claims to my previous 
work on curiosity.
I have tried elsewhere to defend the following claims: fi rst, that in-
trinsic curiosity is an epistemic virtue. Second, that it organizes and 
mobilizes other virtues, both abilities related and morality-related 
ones. Obviously, curiosity is not an ability, it is a motivating truth-
seeking virtue, a choice-related feature of the mind, of the sort simi-
lar to generosity and courage. These virtues are normally praised by 
thinkers like Zagzebski who stress the motivating role of virtues. Curi-
osity also helps integrating other moral-like virtues in the picture and 
accounting for them. They are of two kinds. Either they directly aid cu-
riosity, like open-mindedness does, perhaps preventing the cognizer’s 
mind to get clogged by worthless old stuff. Or, they have to do with oth-
er values (e.g. originality with the value of being new in an interesting 
way) and other kinds of virtue, above all moral virtues (e.g. generosity). 
One should see them as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely epistemic. 
This fi ts the intuition that they have high moral relevance, as well as 
the assumption that they favor reaching purely epistemic goals. This 
preserves both primacy of truth-goal and the traditional and ordinary 
understanding of virtue as a motivating feature. The result would be an 
integrated virtue-based view. What about cognitive capacities or capac-
ity-virtues, like, for instance, well-functioning and well-integrated per-
ception and rational intuition, the kind of virtues mentioned by Sosa 
and Greco inside their very defi nitions of knowledge? Are they really 
virtues? Yes, they are, in their own modest way and the truth-camp 
philosopher should not worry. However, they are not motivating vir-
tues. They are executive virtues. They lead the agent to the epistemic 
goal set primarily by her inquisitiveness, pure or practical.
The proposal perhaps merits to be characterized as an integrated 
virtue-based view, since it is strongly aretaic, integrates motivating 
and executive virtues, and aims at seamlessly integrating the typical 
pursuits of virtue epistemology with the traditional business of episte-
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mology. The character-virtue tradition and the truth-centered one can 
be married in a quiet and civilized fashion, without forcing any shotgun 
wedding between them. Combined with the present claim about the 
response-dependent nature of epistemic value, the proposal becomes 
even stronger: curiosity is the central and the foundational epistemic 
virtue. It is foundational since it bestows epistemic value, and central 
since it organizes other epistemic virtues.
The second issue is the one of the fundamental bearer of epistemic 
value. Truth is central for human cognitive-epistemic effort. I have ar-
gued, briefl y and all too briefl y, that truth is the primary goal, but that 
mere true belief is not the fundamental bearer. Rather, the bearer is 
a relatively minimalist kind of knowledge. Mere true belief cannot be 
rationally accepted in isolation from a supporting structure. However, 
any effi cient supporting structure introduces further epistemic goods 
(justifi cation, reliability, anti-luck guarantees), thus upgrading the 
original true belief. Keep in mind how little epistemic value commands 
the mere true belief (or mere correct ostensible presentation) without 
the supporting structure. And how much more, intuitively seen, is pro-
vided by justifi cation and knowledge (and their objectual correlates). 
And note that the surplus comes from them alone, not from the mini-
mal e-value of true belief.
Mere true belief can be neither defended, nor rationally sustained 
through time, due to isolation. Mere true belief cannot be rationally 
sustained in the face of a slightest bit of contrary evidence (the Meno 
insight). Therefore, mere true belief is not rationally stable. Minimal 
knowledge is, and this accounts for value problem in its various guises.
On the side of objectual curiosity, dear to Inan, we have similar can-
didates for the bearer of epistemic value beside mere correct ostensible 
presentation (concept), namely justifi ed correct ostensible presentation 
and justifi ed correct ostensible presentation with reliable underpin-
ning, not to speak of understanding as a further candidate. As in the 
case of propositional belief, here epistemic goods come in package deals. 
Let me reiterate: curiosity is the central and the foundational epis-
temic virtue. I hope this idea gives a general epistemological frame-
work that would be very friendly to research, like Inan’s on the inner 
nature and proper defi nition of curiosity. I have learned a lot from his 
book and papers, and I hope that we shall continue the fruitful and 
inspiring discussion.
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